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ABSTRACT
Homomorphic Encryption provides unique security solution for cloud computing. It
ensures not only that data in cloud have confidentiality but also that data processing
by cloud server does not compromise data privacy. The Fully Homomorphic Encryp-
tion (FHE) scheme proposed by Lopez-Alt, Tromer, and Vaikuntanathan (LTV), also
known as NTRU(Nth degree truncated polynomial ring) based method, is considered
one of the most important FHE methods suitable for practical implementation.
In this thesis, an efficient algorithm and architecture for LTV Fully Homomorphic
Encryption is proposed. Conventional linear feedback shift register (LFSR) structure
is expanded and modified for performing the truncated polynomial ring multipli-
cation in LTV scheme in parallel. Novel and efficient modular multiplier, modular
adder and modular subtractor are proposed to support high speed processing of LFSR
operations. In addition, a family of special moduli are selected for high speed com-
putation of modular operations. Though the area keeps the complexity of O(Nn2)
with no advantage in circuit level. The proposed architecture effectively reduces the
time complexity from O(NlogN) to linear time, O(N), compared to the best existing
works.
An FPGA implementation of the proposed architecture for LTV FHE is achieved
and demonstrated. An elaborate comparison of the existing methods and the pro-
posed work is presented, which shows the proposed work gains significant speed up
over existing works.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Internet is a worldwide electronic network providing access to millions of informational
resources. The ubiquity of Internet proves that it plays an indispensable role in our
daily life. Internet has revolutionized the computer and communication world like
nothing before. While telegraph, telephone, radio, and computer had set stage for the
unprecedented integration of capabilities, subsequent medium as wireless handheld
electronic devices such as smartphone, tablet, PDA, wearable tech, are also in need
of internet for next generation and future world.
With the rapid increase in the amount of Internet information and data in recent
years, the processing and computing ability of current information technology infras-
tructure has also grown simultaneously. As of September 2018 there were over 1.8
billion web servers in the world reported estimated and reported by Netcraft[3]. Ac-
cording to data and marketing services company IDC, scale of Internet data is going
to reach 63ZB by 2025[4]. One of the reasons why web data grow rapidly is that they
are increasingly stacked up by low budget and numerous number of devices such as
mobile devices, cameras, radio-frequency-identification(RFID) readers and wireless
sensor networks. These small Internet of Things devices capable of information sens-
ing and data processing provide great convenience and unlimited contents for people
to access from anywhere at anytime.
To deal with the explosively growing amount of data, Internet communication
bandwidth and capability of Internet based data processing are being expanded and
optimized. Researchers at Bell labs have reached Internet speed of over 100 petabit
× kilometer per second using fiber optic communication[5]. In addition, quantum
computing technologies continues to advance, which is aimed to significantly improve
upon the data processing capabilities of today’s most formidable electronic machines.
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With that said, people nowadays have growing needs for access of more data contents
and higher amount of information along with the development of technologies such
as video of 4K resolution and VR games.
When people are using their mobile phones and wearable gadgets, they also re-
quire to have access to worldwide resourses and powerful computational ability to cope
with their data on handheld devices. That is when the concept of cloud computing
inevitably came to draw public’s attention in early 2000s[6]. In the history of net-
work technology and communication engineering development, computing paradigm
transformed from massing big load of work for large processor scheme, to distributed
assignment processing scheme based on computer network, to demand processing
cloud computing scheme recently. Cloud computing virtualizes and integrates service
resources on Internet and has specialist responsible for coordination, management
and maintenance, while clients are not necessarily knowledgeable about the internal
realization of cloud. Therefore, cloud computing is a brand new effective computing
paradigm.
Recent development in cloud computing field demonstrates that such a system
providing massive computation and remote data management service has brought
us into a revolutionary digital era. Cloud service has become a major source for
personal users and enterprises when requesting a reliable system to deal with their
data, usually sensitive and private. The cloud offers numerous advantages in costs and
functionality with huge potential and while it is gaining rapidly rising popularity, on
the other hand it also raises grave questions of cloud security and data confidentiality,
since data stored in the cloud could be vulnerable to snooping by the cloud provider
or even by other cloud clients[7].
The vulnerability of cloud computing security results from following reasons:
Multi-tenancy and elasticity are two important feature of cloud model. Multi-tenancy
is the reason why different tenants could share the same service instance. Elasticity
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enables scaling up and down resources allocated to service based on current service
demands. These two properties increase the attackers’ interests in continually finding
and taking advantage of the existing vulnerbilities for the cloud computing model.
When transfering processing data of user to a third party, it is essential to be aware
the responsibility associated with data privacy and compliance and bond a trust con-
nection between user and cloud provider when exploiting benefits of reduced costs,
easy maintainance and reprovisioning of resources.
Because cloud computing is distributed, the location of data stored is sometimes
unknown, different user could share storage or computing resources, which might
compromise the security and expose the information to other user in the same cloud
model. When the data is tranfered to the cloud, standard encryption methods are
used to secure the operations and the storage of data. The conventional security idea
is to encrypt the data before sending it to cloud provider while handing over private
key to the server to decrypt data before performing the calculations as requested
by the user, the assumption that the cloud provider is trustworthy might affect the
confidentiality and privacy of data stored in the cloud.
What is unique about cloud security is that clients or users demand security
against cloud provider or server. Since the cloud service provider could be any third
party company or enterprise, users intend to keep the data private and manage to
not compromise sensitive information to cloud server. Therefore, a new strategy
or countermeasure is required to provide solutions for the exclusive cloud security
problem.
Homomorphic encryption systems were proposed to allow operations on encrypted
data without decrypting the ciphertext, with user the only owner and holder of secret
key. After decryption by the user, the result is same as the operations carried out
on unencyprted data. In this way, a user gets the utmost out of cloud server’s com-
putation capability as well as obaining the expected calculation results, while cloud
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provider correctly processed the data as requested under the premise of not knowing
the content of user data, as well as receiving the finantial support from user.
The term homomorphism appeared first time in history from paper by Rivest,Adleman
and Dertouzous[8] as a possible solution to computation on encrypted data and re-
mained encrypted the whole process. This innovative approach is called homomorphic
encryption. Since then, countless research works towards homomorphic encryption
piled up as trending in cryptography. Homomorphic encryption provides a novel way
to allow computation performed on encrypted data without having access of any por-
tion of plain text. Homomorphic encryption scheme offers a unique security measure
working decently against possible attacks and well suited with the exclusive features
of cloud computing.
In order to achieve practical homomophic encryption scheme, high speed and ef-
ficient algorithm and implementation are demanded. Since the proposal of first plau-
sible Fully homomophic Encryption scheme were given by Graig Gentry[9], numer-
ous papers and researchs were introduced aiming the efficient realization of different
method of fully homomorphic encryption system. This paper explore one of the most
researched and practical fully homomophic schemes, LTV[10] proposed by Lopez-Alt,
Tromer and Vaikuntanathan, and present an efficient architecture and FPGA imple-
mentation of the scheme. In addition, cloud computing system with application of
fully homomophic encryption is discussed.
In this thesis we focus on efficient computation and FPGA implementation of LTV
method. A new algorithm for truncated polynomial ring multiplication algorithm
is proposed. Then a LFSR based architecture is designed for high speed process-
ing of truncated polynomial multiplication. Finally a FPGA implementation of the
proposed architecture is achieved with complexity compared favorably to the recent
existing works.
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1.2 Contribution
The contributions of this thesis are summarized below:
Conventional linear feedback shift register (LFSR) structure is expanded and mod-
ified for computation of the truncated polynomial ring multiplication in LTV cryp-
tosystem. The proposed structure enables parallel computation while keeps compact
and pipelined structure. In addition, a set of unique moduli were chosen to be used in
the computation of modular operations. Calculation speed is much increased results
from the highly efficient modulo computation introduced by the proposed moduli.
Novel and efficient modular multiplier, modular adder and modular subtractor are
proposed for high speed processing of LFSR operations. While parallel prefix adder
structure provide efficient modular addition, Booth algorithm are used to perform
modular multiplication. Our proposed architecture and algorithm provides better
time complexity of linear time O(N) compared to existing works in the literature,
while maintain more or same space complexity. Time and sapce complexity of our
work are analyzed and presented in details. Comparison of FPGA implementation
performance and results of other related works are also given.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, mathematical primitives and
fundamentals are introduced, which includes ring, polynomial rings, and modular
arithmetic in polynomial ring. In addition, the basic parameter sets of LTV Fully
Homomorphic Encyption scheme are shown, while the steps of encryption, decryption
and evaluation part is introduced and explained. In Chapter 3, a detailed introduction
to Homomorphic encryption and its related research works are provided. Also, the
contemporary trend of widely used cloud computing applications is analyzed. From
what is studied, the model of cloud computing and the application of intergration with
Homomorphic Encryption will be depicted. In Chapter 4 of the thesis, an overview
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of several existing related works on LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme is
scrutinized. Chapter 5 presentsf our proposed work for LTV Fully Homomorphic En-
cryption scheme. In this chapter, an LFSR based multiplier architecture is proposed
to perform polynomial multiplication in set Rq[x]. Besides, proposed modular adder,
modular subtractor and modular multiplier will be explicitly described. In Chap-
ter 6, the complexities of proposed work is analyzed and summarized. The FPGA
implementation results are presented along with comparision of proposed work and
existing work. In Chapter 7, the conclusion and possible future work are discussed.
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2 MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
This chapter first introduces truncated polynomial ring, as the mathematical back-
ground of LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme. Then, an overview of LTV
Fully Homomorphic Encryption system is given, which includes key generation, en-
cryption, decryption and evaluation. The parameter sets selection for LTV Fully
Homomorphic Encryption is also discussed.
2.1 Truncated Polynomial Ring
2.1.1 Ring
Definition A Ring is a non-empty set R together with binary operations + and ·
defined on R with two mappings:
+ : R×R→ R, (a, b) 7→ a+ b
· : R×R→ R, (a, b) 7→ a · b
such that addition operation satisfies:
Additive associativity: a+ (b+ c) = (a+ b) + c, for a, b, c, ∈ R.
Additive communitivity: a+ b = b+ a, for a, b ∈ R.
Additive identity: There is an identity element e in R such that for all a ∈ R,
a+ e = e+ a = a.
Additive inverse: For a ∈ R, there exists an inverse element a−1 ∈ R such that
a+ a−1 = a−1 + a = e.
Also multiplication operation satisfies:
Multiplicative associativity: For a, b, c ∈ R, we have a · (b · c) = (a · b) · c.
Distributivity: a · (b+ c) = a · b+ a · c, and (a+ b) · c = a · b+ b · c.
Examples of ring are populous and here is a few of them:
All of Z,Q,R and C under the operations of addition and multiplication are
commutative rings with identity (with the number 1 as the identity); Under the usual
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matrix addition and matrix multiplication for collection of matrices over some ring
R form a matrix ring; Modulo 2 arithmetic on 0, 1 is a two element commutative
ring with identity. More generally, for addition and multiplication modulo n on
0, 1, ..., n− 1 considered, we also get a commutative ring with identity; Polynoimials
with real coefficients form a commutative ring with identity under the usual addition
and multiplication.
2.1.2 Truncated polynomial ring
Consider the polynomial ring that contains all the polynomials with degree up to
a certain value N − 1 taken modulo φ(x) = xN + 1 and with integer coefficients.
This is called truncated polynomial ring (with integer coefficients) and denoted by
R[x]/(xN + 1). Let a(x), b(x) ∈ R[x]/φ(x):
a(x) = a0 + a1x+ ...+ aN−1xN−1 (1)
b(x) = b0 + b1x+ ...+ bN−1xN−1 (2)
We must able to add and multiply elements of R[x]/φ(x) so that the axioms defining
a ring hold true.
Here are some basic properties of truncated polynomial ring:
• Equality
If a(x)a0 + a1x+ ...+ aN−1xN−1 and b(x) = b0 + b1x+ ...+ bN−1xN−1 are in ring
R , then a(x) = b(x) stands if and only if ai = bi, for every integer i ≥ 0.
In other words, two polynomials are declared to be equal if and only if their
corresponding coefficients are equal.
• Addition
If a(x) = a0 + a1x + ... + aN−1xN−1 and b(x) = b0 + b1x + ... + bN−1xN−1 are
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both in ring R, then:
a(x) + b(x) = c0 + c1 + ...+ cN−1xN−1 (3)
Where
ci = ai + bi, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ t.
To elaborate, definition of addition of two polynomila in polynomial ring is to
add two polynomial by adding their coefficients and collecting terms. To add
1 + x and 3 − 2x + x2 we consider 1 + x as 1 + x + 0x2 and add, according to
the given definition, to obtain as their sum 4− x+ x2.
The multiplication defined for R should be more complicated.
• Multiplication
if a(x) = a0 + a1x+ ...+ aN−1xN−1 and b(x) = b0 + b1x+ ...+ bN−1xN−1 , then
a(x)b(x) = c0 + c1 + ...+ cN−1xN−1 (4)
where
ct = ±
m∑
i=0
t−i∑
j=0
aibj = ±atb0 ± at−1b1 ± at−2b2 ± ...± aobt, 0 ≤ t ≤ N − 1 (5)
This definition explain the multiplication in polynomial ring is to multiply two
polynomial by multipliying out the symbols formally, use the relation xαxβ =
xα+β. The kth coefficient ck is simply the dot product of the coefficients of a
and the coefficients of b except that coefficients of b are listed in reverse order
and are rotated around k positions.
Example: Let
a(x) = 1 + x− x2,
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b(x) = 2 + x2 + x3
Thus
c0 = a0b0 = 1 · 2 = 2,
c1 = a1b0 + a0b1 = 1 · 2 + 1 · 0 = 2,
c2 = a2b0 + a1b1 + a0b2 = (−1) · 2 + 1 · 0 + 1 · 1 = −1,
c3 = a3b0 + a2b1 + a1b2 + a0b3 = 2,
c4 = a4b0 + a3b1 + a2b2 + a1b3 + a0b4 = 0,
c5 = a5b0 + a4b1 + a3b2 + a2b3 + a1b4 + a0b5 = −1,
c6 = a6b0 + a5b1 + a4b2 + a3b3 + a2b4 + a1b5 + a0b6 = 0,
c7 = c8 = ... = 0.
According to definition of multiplication rules,
(1 + x− x2)(2 + x2 + x3) = c0 + c1x+ c2x2 + ...c6x6
= 2 + 2x− x2 + 2x3 − x5.
The multiplication of polynomial ring is commutative and it has a unit element.
• Inverse
The inverse modulo q of a polynomial a(x) is a polynomial b(x) with the prop-
erty that
a(x) · b(x) = 1 mod q
It can be also written as:
b(x) = a(x)−1 mod q
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Not every polunomial has an inverse modulo q in the ring, but it is easy to
determine if a(x) has an inverse or not, or to compute the inverse if it exists.
For example:
Take N = 7, q = 11, a(x) = 3 + 2x2 − 3x4 + x6.
The inverse of a(x) mod q is
b(x) = −2 + 4x+ 2x2 + 4x3 − 4x4 + 2x4 + 2x5 − 2x6
Since
a(x) · b(x) = (3 + 2x2 − 3x4 + x6) · (−2 + 4x+ 2x2 + 4x3 − 4x4 + 2x4 + 2x5 − 2x6)
= −10 + 22x+ 22x3 − 22x6
= 1 modulo 11
• Modular Operations
f(x) mod P (x) means “the remainder of (f(x)÷ P (x))” .
– It can be denoted f(x) = a(x)P (x)+b(x), where the degree of b(x) is lower
than that of P (x), then f(x) mod P (x) = b(x).
– Polynomial division: (f(x)÷ P (x)) to obtain the remainder.
Example:
1. Let f(x) = x8 + 1, P (x) = x3 + x2 + 1
f(x) mod P (x) = x8 + 1 mod x3 + x2 + 1
= 6x2 − 3x+ 5
where the quotient is x5 − x4 + x3 − 2x2 + 3x− 4.
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2. Let f(x) = x10 , and P (x) = x2 + x+ 1
f(x) mod P (x) = x10 mod x2 + x+ 1
= x
and the quotient is x8 − x7 + x5 − x4 + x2 − x.
Truncated polynomial ring is the algebra primitive that LTV Fully Homomorphic
Encyprion defined over with. The truncated polynomial ring, which is denoted as
R = Z[x]/(xn + 1) in the literature. N is a prime number. In this notation, Z[x]
represent the set of polynomials of arbitrary degree with interger coefficients and
xn + 1 is the modulo that the polynomial is taken. It can be seen that the set of R
contains all the polynomials with integer coefficients of degree up to N − 1.
In addition to the limitation for the degree on polynomial in the truncated poly-
nomial ring, another particular restrain is also requested for LTV Fully Homomophic
Encryption scheme. The elements in truncated polynomial ring R for LTV Fully
Homomorphic Encryption scheme can be viewed as degree N polynomials with the
coefficients taken modulo of prime number q, which demonstrate that all integer coef-
ficients for the LTV truncated polynomial ring are supposed to be coming from range
[0, q].
So LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption system works in the truncated polynomial
ring R taken modulo xN + 1 and q, which is expressed by Rq = Zq[x]/(xn + 1).
2.2 LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Figure 2.1 shows the key generation, encryption, decryption and evaluation process
of LTV Fully Homomorphic Encyption scheme.
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2.2.1 Parameter sets
For LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption to be both secure and correct, concrete sets
of parameter need to be chosen carefully. An proven secure range of required param-
eters sets and values of selection for determined security level is shown below[11]:
• An integer N , fix N to be power of two.
• An integer p, fix p = 2. This choice provides a useful message space and cause
the least possible expansion on the noise.
• Set χ to be the discrete Gaussian distribution DZN ,r, for some standard de-
viation r > 0. Elements can be efficiently drawn from this distribution and
moreover.
• With N a power of two and a degree N polynomial φ(x) = xN + 1, the noise
distribution can be spherical and the worst case reduction still hold[12].
• Set r = √2N/pi, so that ring-LWE is as hard as lattice problem in the worst
case[12].
• Choose a prime q ∈ [dN6ln(N), 2dN6ln(N)], such that q ≡ mod 2N . For
d = 25830, correctness of the scheme can be guaranteed. Experimentally, less
aggressive and lower value of d is obtained.
The parameters N, q, χ are public. The message space for the LTV Fully Homo-
morphic Encryption scheme is M = 0, 1 and all the operations are performed in the
ring Rq = Zq[x]/(φ(x)). We associate Zq with the set {− bq/2c , ..., bq/2c} throughout
the thesis, to satisfy the absence of wrap round error.
2.2.2 Encrption
The LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme is parametrized by a prime number
q and a bounded error distribution R = Z[x]/(xN + 1) over polynomials whose coef-
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ficients are all at most q in absolute value. All operations in this scheme take place
in the ring Rq = R/qR.
• KeyGeneration
Sample bounded polynomial f ′, g ← χ
Set f := 2f ′ + 1 so that f ≡ 1(mod 2). If f is not invertible in Rq, re-sample
f ′.
Compute the public key as:
Kpub := h = 2gf
−1 ∈ Rq. (6)
Set secret key as:
Kpri := f ∈ R. (7)
For all τ ∈ {0, ..., blogqc}, sample sτ , eτ ← χ .
Compute γτ = hsτ + 2eτ + 2
τf ∈ Rq.
Set evaluation key as:
Keva = (γ0, ..., γblogqc) ∈ Rdlogqeq (8)
The public key h, counterpart secret key f and evaluation key are acquired
through above steps.
• Encryption(Kpub,m)
Kpub := h = 2gf
−1 ∈ Rq , Kpri := f ∈ R
Sample polynomials s, e← χ. Output the ciphertext
c := hs+ 2e+m ∈ Rq (9)
Where all operations are done with modulo q and φ(x).
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Fig. 2.1: Encryption process for LTV FHE
When above two steps are done, ciphertext is computed and output as polyno-
mial c.
• Decryption(sk, c)
Output
µ = fc ∈ Rq (10)
m′ := µ (mod 2) (11)
Decrypted message m is obtained after the success completion of above compu-
tations.
Decryption works because:
fc (mod q) = f(hs+ 2e+m) (mod q)
= 2(gs+ ef) + fm (mod q)
= 2(gs+ ef) + fm
Where the last quality is true since |2(gs+ ef) + fm| < q/2. Taking this
quantity mod 2 then gives the message m since f ≡ 1 (mod 2).
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2.2.3 Evaluation
In this section we show how to homomorphically add and multiply two elements.
Given two cihpertexts c1, c2, there are a series of different public keys connected with
each ciphertext. Public keys will be represented as K1, K2 respectively.
• Evaluation addition
– Two ciphertexts c1 and c2 are encrypted by the corresponding public key
sets K1,and K2.
– Output ciphertext:
cadd = c1 + c2 ∈ Rq (12)
– Output the set Kadd = K1 ∪K2 as its corresponding public key set.
• Evaluation multiplication
– Given two ciphertexts c1 and c2 with corresponding public key set K1,
K2, computing ciphertext c˜0 = c1 · c2 ∈ Rq ,and let K1 ∩ K2 =
{Kpubi1 , ..., Kpubir}
– If K1 ∩K2 = ∅, let cmult = c˜0.
– Otherwise for j ∈= [r] and τ = {0, ..., blog qc }, define c˜j−1,τ so that
c˜j−1 =
blog qc∑
τ
c˜j−1,τ2τ (13)
is binary representation for c˜j−1
– Parse
Kevaij = (rij ,0, ..., rij ,blog qc) (14)
let
c˜j =
blog qc∑
τ=0
c˜j−1,τrij ,blog qc (15)
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– Output cmult = c˜ as encryption of product of messages, output the set
Kmult = K1 ∩K2 as it corresponding public key set.
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3 HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION AND CLOUD
SECURITY
This chapter introduce the concept of homomorphic encryption. In fact, all different
homomophic attempts can be generally categorized under three types of schemes with
respect to the allowed times of operations and supported type(s) of operations on
the encrypted data as Partially Homomorphic Encryption, Somewhat Homomophic
Encryption and Fully Homomorphic Encyption. The research timeline and history of
homomorphic encryption methods are given, as well as the important corresponding
homomorphic properties.
Cloud computing security in modern society is analyzed. Solutions to cloud secu-
rity based on applications of homomorphic encryption are discussed. Illustrations of
specific encyption process scheme that are applied in cloud computing scenario are
also presented.
3.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is divided into three categories: Partially Homomorphic
Encryption(PHE), Somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) and Fully Homo-
morphic Encryption(FHE) scheme. Partially Homomorphic Encryption support only
one type of operation with a unlimited time of usages. While Somewhat Homomor-
phic Encryption allow some type of computations such as addition or multiplication
operations carried on cipher text with a limited number of time, Fully Homomor-
phic Encryption supports securely unlimited time of arbitrary computations over
encrypted data without decrypting the data[9].
Due to its unique security properties, Homomorphic Encryption(HE) gained much
attention from various industries. A series of applications and potential areas of use
are illustrate in 3.1.
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Fig. 3.1: An overview of HE applications
The idea of Homomorphic Encryption problem was first mentioned by Rivest,
Adleman[8] in 1978 with an alternative term of privacy homomorphism. The open
problem maintained a mirage for over 30 years since then and have been known to be
the“holy grail” of cryptography[13]. The construction and solution of such scheme
seemed to be even more impractical until Stanford PhD thesis proposed by Gentry[9]
was theoretically achieved in 2009.
There was an appreciable amount of homomorphic encryption schemes introduced
during this period: unpadded RSA[14] or ElGamal encryption scheme [15] and cryp-
tography of Goldwasser-Micali[16], Benaloh [17], Paillier[18], Damgard[19] and Regev
[20] [21]. The examples given above allow computation either one type of operation
or limited numner of operations such as addition or multiplication on cipher texts.
Huge breakthrough was made when first plausible homomorphic encryption scheme
proposed by Gentry[9] supports both addition and multiplication operations based on
ideal lattices. The long last question about whether it is possible to realize a fully ho-
momorphic encryption system is finally solved due to availability of arbitrary compu-
tation on cipher text in polynomial time. The paper initiate the research enthusiasm
in cryptography and computer science field carried out on fully homomorphic encryp-
tion. A list of extension of Gentry’s work can be found in [21], [12],[22],[23],[24],[25].
The security of these efficient schemes are mostly based on hardness of learning-with-
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error (LWE) or ring-learning-with-error (RLWE) problems.
3.1.1 Patially Homomorphic Encryption
PHE schemes are often seen in particular application of electronic-voting or private
information retrieval. But the application of PHE method is restricted in terms of
the type of homomorphic evaluation opertions. In orther words, it can only be used
in some certain scenarios with only addtion or multiplication operation are required.
RSA is one of the representative public key cryptography systems introduced by
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman[14] in 1978. Its security is based on hard problem of
large prime factorization. Using the term ‘privacy homomorphism’ for the first time in
history, the paper showed the homomorphic property over only multiplication, where
E(m1* m2) can be directly evaluated by using E(m1) and E(m2) without decrypting
them first. Apparently RSA does not support homomorphism of addition, thus it is
classified as partially homomorphic encrytion.
Given RSA public key (N, h) and two plaintext m1,m2, the multiplication of two
ciphertext returns a computed multiplication in the encrypted domain as follows:
Enc(m1)× Enc(m2) = (mh1 mod N)× (mh2 mod N)
= (m1 × m2)h mod N
= Enc(m1 ×m2)
(16)
In 1985, based on original Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm, a new public key
encryption scheme called Elgamal were proposed by Taher Elgaml[15], which is based
on the hard mathmetic problem of discrete logarithm. The Elgamal cryptosystem is
multiplicatively homomorphic and not satisfy addtitive homomorphism.
Pailleir[18] proposed a novel probabilistic encryption scheme based on compos-
ite residuosity problem which is homomorphic over addition, while later work by
Damgard-jurik [19] presented another PHE scheme as a generalization and improve-
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ment of Paillier system.
The Pailleir scheme [18] is limited to only additive homomorphism. Given the
public key (N, h), a random number (r1, r2) and two plaintext m1 and m2, the mul-
tiplication of two ciphertexts returns a computed addition in the encrypted domain
as follows:
Enc(m1)× Enc(m2) = [(gm1 · rN1 )× (gm2 × rN2 )]mod N2
= [(gm1+m2)(r1r2)
N ]mod N
= Enc(m1 +m2)
(17)
3.1.2 Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption
There were SWHE researched before and after first FHE scheme came out in 2009.
Some major SWHE methods were used as stepping stone towards practical FHE,
while some were proposed with performance associated with FHE scheme.
BGN, one of the most significant SWHE, was introduced by Boneh-Goh-Nissim[26]
in 2005. The hardness of the scheme is based on subgroup decision problem. Homo-
morphism over addition and multiplication are satisfied but further operations are
not supported.
Sander[27] described a SWHE scheme supported a limited depth circuit evaluation
on a semi group, and Kawachi’s proposal[28] allow additive homomorphism.
3.1.3 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
If a encryption scheme allows unlimited number of arbitrary evaluation operation on
encrypted data, it is called Fully Homomorphic Encryption(FHE). 30 years after the
presentation of homomorphism concept by Rivest,etc[8] in 1978, Standford Univer-
sity graduate C.Gentry introduced the first plausible structure to construct a feasible
Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme in his PhD thesis[9]. Plenty of research works
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Fig. 3.2: An overview of FHE timeline
afterwards indulged in creating new FHE system and improve Gentry’s innovation
from 2009. Most of the later efforts are generally based on the blueprint provided
by Gentry himself, that is, Gentry proposed a conventional framework for other re-
searchers to follow his basic design. Diagram 3.2 shows the history of development of
FHE researches.
Several new techniques that were developed starting 2011 led to the development
of much more efficient Fully Homomorphic Cryptosystems. These include:
• Lattice based FHE
Gentry’s first Fully Homomorphic Encryption, also known as ideal lattice based
FHE scheme, uses ideal lattice to make huge breakthrough from SWHE struc-
ture. An SWHE can only evaluate ciphertext homomorphically for limited
number of times. When dealing with a certain amount of calculations on ci-
phertext, decryption process is not available to retrieve the original message
accurately.
The increasing chunk of noise must be reduced to convert noisy ciphertext to
corresponding plaintext. Homomorphic operations can be applied to ciphertext
with only small amount of noise. When the noise parameter become close to
lattice point, or threshold, it is not feasible to decrypt cipher properly. Gentry
proposed a novel method named bootstrapping to support a particular amount
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of homomorphic operations to be performed on ciphertext, which iterate works
for unlimited time. In this way, the scheme become fully homomorphic encryp-
tion.
The bootstrapping process basically works as follow: first the homomorphic
decryption of the noisy ciphertext removes the noise, then the new homomorphic
encryption introduces new small noise to the ciphertext. The ciphertext is now
like just encrypted. Further homomorphic operations can be computed on this
fresh ciphertext until reaching to a threshold again. This is where FHE become
impractical for its noticeably computation cost and result in a major drawback
for Fully Homomorphic Encryption.
A noticeable number of following FHE methods were presented to improve Gen-
try’s original work. Gentry himself introduced a advanced key generation al-
gorithm in [29] which improved the initial proposal’s security level based on a
quantum worst case reduction problem since the former one’s key generation
algorithm is used for a particular purpose only and the generation of an ideal
lattice with a good basis is left without a solution[30]. Another probabilistic
decryption algorithm with lower multiplicative degree, which is the aquare root
of previous decryption circuit degree, was gived by Stehle and Steinfeld[31]. In
addition, a new FHE scheme, which is a variant of Gentry’s scheme was intro-
duced in[32]. This scheme uses smaller ciphertext and key sizes than Gentry’s
scheme without sacrificing the security. Alternative works [33] [34] [35]focused
on the optimizations in the key generation algorithm in order to implement the
FHE efficiently.
• FHE over integers
After Gentry’s ideal lattice based scheme, a novel FHE scheme is presented in
[36] which used bootstrapoing method to construct Fully Homomorphic En-
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cryption. The new proposed approach is over the integer and the hardness of
the method is based on Approximate Greatest Common Divisor(AGCD), with
the primary motivation behind the scheme having conceptual simplicity. The
paper[36] provide a way for transforming existing symmetric version of HE to
asymmetric HE scheme, which states that the scheme is a public key encryption
system.
While the relatively complex components of structure based on ideal lattice
is replaced by a uncomplicated architecture over integers, the simplicity at-
tained trade off for computation cost. A few following optimization works[37]
[38][39]concentrate on decreasing size of public keys.
Some subsequent methods for FHE schemes over integers are proposed too.
Scale invariant FHE over the integers [40], a new scheme with integer plaintexts[39],
a new SWHE scheme for computing arithmetic operations on large integer
numbers without converting them into bits[41], a new symmetric FHE without
bootstrapping[42], a new FHE for non binary message space[43]. All Schemes
mentioned above improved FHE over the integers scheme in their own way.
• LWE based FHE
Learing With Error(LWE) problem which is conjectured hard to be solved, is
as hard to solve as several worst case lattice problem even for post quantum
algorithm. The hardness of worst case lattice problem like SVP is reduced to
LWE, that is, the problem of SVP would be solved in polynomial time with
a particular algorithm if this algorithm could be used to work out LWE in
efficient time. The idea stimulate the growing researches over post quantum
cryptography with relatively small ciphertext size. A significant variant of LWE
problem was introduced by Lyubashvsky[12] regarding algebra structure of ring-
Learing with error. The ring-LWE is able to be reduced to worst case on ideal
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lattice problem which is not efficiently breakable in polynomial time by quantum
algorithm and considered more efficient for practical applications and stronger
security level than original LWE problem.
Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan[44] constituted a SWHE scheme using efficient
feature of ring-LWE make it one step closer to practical FHE with Gentry’s
basic bootstrapping and squashing techniques, because ring-LWE is regarded
as better performance than LWE scheme. A leveled FHE scheme without us-
ing bootstrapping method was provided in [22], in respond to the fact that
bootstrapping process cost too much computation resource to finish. In Brak-
erski’s new scale invariant Fully Homomorphic Ecryption scheme, noise grows
linearly with evaluation of homomorphic operation instead of exponentially and
the scheme is based on hard problem of GapSVP. Some notable modifications
include [45] reducing overhead of key switching and faster evaluation of homo-
morphic operations and [46] using relinearization to improve efficiency.
In addition, some later proposal [23],[24],[25] are introduced to extend the per-
formance and achieved better optimization results.
3.2 LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption
A more practical and applicable FHE scheme LTV was derived from an old and secure
cryptosystem NTRUEncrypt, which is a public key cryptography system proposed
by Hoffstein, J [47]. It was named after the initials of three authors of Lopez-Alt,
Eran Tromer, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan[10], who obtained a multi-key FHE scheme
based on NTRUEncrypt. Lopez-Alt discoverd the homomorphic properties hidden
in NTRUEncrypt scheme and developed LTV method with a few differences. First,
the variant add a set of noises from a discrete Gaussian distribution with bounded
support in stead of a deterministic set in original scheme. Second, the computation
environment is different, LTV method performs operations in polynomial ring set
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Rq = Z[x]/(xN + 1) where N is power of 2, while in NTRUEncrypt cryptosystem
the base algebra structure is polynomial ring Rq = Z[x]/(xN − 1) where N is prime.
Third, more aggressive parameter sets provide higher security level and more complex
computation to support fully homomorphism.
One of the unique features of LTV Homomophic Encryption scheme is the multikey
homomorphism for two party computation. Let (h1, f1) and (h2, f2) be two different
public and secret key sets. Let c1 = h1s1 + 2e1 +m1 and c2 = h2s2 + 2e2 +m2 be two
ciphertexts encrypted under public key h1 and h2 respectively. The computation of
ciphertexts that decrypted to sum and the product of m1 and m2. Using the secret
key f1 · f2 the ciphertext cmult = c1 · c2 and cadd = c1 + c2 can be decrypted to the
product and the sum of m1 and m2 respectively.
The multikey homomorphism properties for two party computation is shown below
using joint secret key set k1, k2.
• Multikey Homomorphism over addition
f1f2(c1 + c2)(mod 2) = 2(f1f2(e1 + e2) + f2g1s1 + f1g2s2) + f1f2(m1 +m2)(mod 2)
= 2eadd + f1f2(m1 +m2)
= m1 +m2(mod 2)
(18)
• Multikey Homomorphism over multiplication
f1f2(c1c2)(mod 2) = 2(2g1g2s1s2 + g1s1f2(2e2 +m2) + g2s2f1(2e1 +m1)
+ f1f2(e1m2 + e2m1 + 2e1e2)) + f1f2(m1m2)(mod 2)
= 2emult + f1f2(m1m2)
= m1m2(mod 2)
(19)
Since f1 ≡ 1(mod 2) and f2 ≡ 1(mod 2).
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In other words, joint secret key f1f2 can be used to decrypt cadd = c1 + c2 and
cmult = c1 · c2. We can extend this argument to any combination of operations, with
ciphertexts encrypted under multiple public keys. It is also seen that multikey ho-
momoprhic operation increase noise more than a single key homomorphic evaluation.
However, m1 +m2 and m1m2 can still be recovered correctly using the joint obtained
secret key since f, g, s, e are all sampled from bounded ditribution χ. In other words,
the decryption part works well if the noise parameters eadd and cmult are smaller than
[−bq/2c , bq/2c].
3.3 Homomorphic Properties
Let c1 and c2 be two ciphertexts. When two messages m1 and m2 are both encrypted
by the shared secret key f , the homomorphic properties could be expess as:
• Addition
Define the sum of two ciphertexts as:
cadd = c1 + c2
For the additive homomorphic property, we have:
f · cadd mod 2 = f(c1 + c2) mod 2
= f · c1 + f · c2 mod 2
= µ1 + µ2 mod 2
= m1 +m2 mod 2
= m1 +m2
(20)
From above, the summation of two ciphertext can be decrypted as summation
of two plaintexts or messages with additive homomorphic property.
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• Multiplication
Define the product of two ciphertext as:
cmult = c1 · c2
For multiplicative homomorphic property, we have:
f 2 · cmult mod 2 = f 2 · (c1 · c2) mod 2
= (f · c1) · (f · c2) mod 2
= µ1 · µ2 mod 2
= m1 ·m2 mod 2
= m1 ·m2 mod 2
(21)
So that the product of two ciphertext can be decrypted as product of two
plaintexts or messages with multiplicative homomorphic property.
• Addition and multiplication
From
f = 2f ′ + 1
we get
f ≡ 1 mod 2
Then
fk ·m mod 2 = m (22)
A combination of additions and multiplications can be reallized through mul-
tiplying the encrypted ciphertext by fk, f is the secret key and k is the depth
of the longest chain of multiplication. Noise in result ciphertext grows with the
increaing number of additions and multiplications.
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One of the main challenges for extension of Somewhat Homomorphic Encryp-
tion to Fully Homomoprhic Encryption is the management and control of noise.
This is often the reason why fully homomorphic encryption schemes are con-
sidered less efficient. Noise grows linearly with addition operations and while
exponentially with multiplication operations. As long as the noise remains be-
low a certain threshold, the message will be recovered without failure. However,
if the magnitude of growing noise after each operation is over a certain level, it
is hard to obtain the correct result of homomorphic encryption operation, which
also affects the security and homomorphism. The importance of this trade off
between noise level and security becomes significant and apparent when consid-
ering the homomorpic properties of the scheme.
• Relinearization
The product ciphertext is supposed to be multiplied with the secret key for k
times in order to decrypt a product of k ciphertext. The depth of the circuit
will have to be kept track of, which is somehow turned out to be complex if the
circuit is complicated.
Relinearization enable multiplying the result ciphertext by secret key only for
one time, which make it possible to decrypt arbitrary combination of opera-
tions including additions and multiplications of the ciphertext. Evaluation key
introduced in Section 2.2.3 is used in this process.
• Modulus reduction
When an exponential gain on the depth of the computational circuit is gener-
ated in evaluation stage with the noise growth rapidly, modulus reduction offers
a noise management technique to control the noise after every time of the eval-
uation operation through scaling the ciphertext value. The maximum depth
of the computational circuit is therefore consequently increased by repeatedly
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Fig. 3.3: Cloud computing applications
applying the process.
3.4 Cloud Computing and Homomorphic Encryption
Cloud computing is another evolution in information technology after the presence
of computer and Internet. According to NIST[48], cloud computing is a model for
enabling convenient, on demand network access to a shared pool of configurable
computing resources(e.g, networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimum management effort or service
provider interaction. Nowadays we see cloud as a set of solutions integrating multi-
ple technology and corresponding application. It incorporate distributed computing,
virtualization, grid computing, load balance and parallel computing into information
ecosystem. The application of cloud technology enable every enterprise and personal
user to make better and faster use of advanced information technology. The Graph 3.3
shows cloud computing technique connect differenct devices and terminal together.
The rise of cloud computing made it possible for public users to have access of
computation service of low cost, high performance, large quantity, and fast config-
uration. While the introductory of cloud computing benefits various IT fields with
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economic scale and high scalability, it also expose certain latent threat in security
aspect due to its technical features. Based on the different service categorization that
cloud computing provides, it is classified as three basic service delivery modes:
• IaaS( Infrastructure as a Service):
Cloud provider deploy technique such as virtualization on fundamental platform
to coordinate infrastructure construction and improve utilization. Users are
able to get access to a virtual server (an IaaS provider), bypassing the time
and effort they contribute on establishing their own data centers or deploying
services. IaaS provide function of pay-as-you-go and mensurable resource pool
in heterogeneous resources environment, while satisfy user demand and fully
utilize hardware resources. Amazon web service’s elastic computer cloud, also
known as EC2, is a typical example for IaaS platform.
• PaaS(Platform as a Service):
PaaS provides enterprise development, operation interface and environment for
companies to realize self service and thus achieve unified service on platform
level. Cloud provider give customers platform and every business service they
need to build, dispatch and manage application of their own, omitting the pro-
cess of installing platforms and supporting environment on client side. PaaS lies
on top of IaaS hierarchy. Not only does it focus on integration of underlying
hardware resource, it is also required to accommodate platform environment
for tenants to implement developing and debugging applications. Therefore,
the security issue of PaaS is definitely a major concern for providers. Google
Apps and Microsoft Azure are most famous PaaS provider.
• SaaS (Software as a Service) :
SaaS offers users with uniformed service interface, for example, provide the
service using multi-user architecture with browser or other client application.
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SaaS providers deliver applications hosted on the cloud infrastructure as Inter-
net based service for end users. While it take full advantage of utilizing lower
level resources, it is supposed to provide clients with customized application
service through deploying one or several software environment as well. Despite
the merits of operational efficiency and reduced costs, enterprises often ponder
on applying it into practice in term of the obscurity between security level and
data storage. SalesForce CRM is one of the prominent example of SaaS supplier.
Fig. 3.4: Cloud service delivery model
Each service type is based on distinct implementation layer, as shown in Figure
3.4 [49]. It can be seen from the figure that service resources provided by upper level
service provider, such as SaaS service, are able to set up service resource indepen-
dently. Also SaaS application developer can accommodate them on other leased PaaS
platforms.
While the innovative service mechanism make users obtain almost infinite com-
putation ability and wide range of information service, it is the evolvement of combi-
nation of distributed computing, parallel computing and grid computing. The novel
pattern use network to integrate and expand needed resources (hardware, platform,
software) to build a reliable high performance computation platform.
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3.4.1 Security threat
Multiple categories of security threat over cloud computing system are listed below:
1. Privileged user access: With user data stored in server from cloud service
provider, processing data out of reign of user per se boost security risk to some
extent since administrator of service operator might have permission to access
and process of data.
2. Compliance: Cloud computing operator has obligation in supporting third party
institute to offer censorship of accuracy and security level. The security of data
will be threatened if some service provider turn down external audit and safe
authentication.
3. Data location: Cloud computing clients have no knowledge of the location where
data store at.
4. Data segregation: All users under cloud computing environment process their
data in shared pool of system. Total data safety requires not only encryption,
but also data segregation.
5. Data recovery: Providers are supposed to back up entire data chunk, in order to
recover user data shortly after occurrence of physical catastrophe and artificial
vandalism.
6. Investigative support: With multiple users data stored as a group, it will be
difficult to investigate when delinquent behaviors happens.
7. Long term viability: Service providers are not supposed to go bankrupt in terms
of avoiding influencing user data stability and sustainability.
8. Support in reducing risking: Instructions are provided to administrators and
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managers for setting and monitoring policies to evaluate information and sup-
port customer staff to understand how to safely and reliably use their product.
3.4.2 Application of security system
With all users data stored on cloud, they lost absolute control over their private in-
formation on the fly. Therefore, cloud service provider must pledge secure and strong
guarantee to ensure authenticity, integrity and confidentialitty of those contents. In
order to do that, encryption over the data being transmitted and saved is inevitable
essential.
The homomorphism of Fully Homomorphic Encryption can perform any proces-
sion to sensitive data after encrypting original message without leaking contained
private information. Performing Fully Homomorphic Encryption algorithm on pro-
cessing data with enciphering bring us reliable safety measure during cloud compu-
tation. To put it in another way, encrypting sensitive data before synchronizing local
data to boost data security level. Even if these data were stolen, malicious users only
retrieve cipher text after encryption. One can not work out the plain text without
keys where processed by users instead of cloud side. Meanwhile, with the help of
homomorphism of Fully Homomorphic Encryption, cloud will possess the ability to
process cipher text data. The defects in wasting resources and low efficiency of tra-
ditional operations can thus be avoided. while normal encryption approaches need
to sent cipher data to user terminal, eventually transmit data back to cloud side on
decryption operation performed on them by users.
A data security scheme constructed by cloud computing based on Fully Homo-
morphic Encryption is consist of user terminal and cloud side as shown in Figure 3.5.
There are different role for user and cloud in the cloud computing sytem. For users,
personal computers, client machines, cell phones and other devices provide hardware
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Fig. 3.5: Cloud security scheme model
conditions for users to implement information transactions through cloud computing
system login program. Users are also responsible for submitting user request over
the cloud, encrypting and decrypting user private data, uploading and downloading
cipher text.
The works by cloud include application managing system, data processing system,
data storage system, key management and authentication module. Most important
one of all is application manage system, which is obliged to coordinate process user
requests. For example, basic order over inquiry for encryption key or user authen-
tication is delivered to key management and authentication module, assignment for
computation upon raw data is handed over to data process system.
The data ready for direct saving is processed by data storage system waiting for
collaboration of information sharing between users. Data process system is made up
of data retrieval, data computation, data upgrading sections. Data storage system
perform storing of cloud data, which utilizing user data location recorded to store
and extract user data. Key manage and authentication system is responsible for key
generation and storing.
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Below are specific steps for the scheme:
1. User access to cloud: After receiving user requests, application manage system
repost user information to key mange and authentication module, where a pair
of symmetry key based on user information from certain algorithm is generated
afterwards to bind user information and key together before finally encrypted
and stored. Application manage system send key pairs to users via safe channel.
2. User encrypt data on client terminal with keys, transmit encrypted cipher text
data towards cloud side. Application manage system store them in storage
system on receiving those data.
3. When user need to use the data, application manage system extract data back
to user from storage system upon receival of user requests before users obtain
the data, decrypt it and apply it for practical usage.
4. With the feature of Fully Homomorphic Encryption algorithm, data process
system perform direct retrieval in cipher text database for encrypted key words
when operations of data searching is needed.
5. It then deliver cipher text data retrieved to users, who will have access to it
after decryption without decrypting entire cipher database before retrieval. The
method discussed saves time, boost benefits for users and reduce system cost.
3.4.3 FHE scheme over cloud: a scenario
This scenario use Fully Homomorphic Encryption which has wide applications in
various fields:
(1) Privacy protection: User data is transmitted as cipher text to cloud and saved.
In this way, security of data during transmission process is assured, as well as storage
of data, for cloud service provider impossible to obtain plain text information.
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Fig. 3.6: FHE over cloud: a scenario
(2) Data process: Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme let user and trusted
third party perform process operations directly on cipher text data, with absence of
original data. Having the computation results in hands, users start to decrypt and
thus retrieve data processed.
For example, in medical or health care information system, electronic prescriptions
are all stocked on cloud server in the format of cipher text. Sometimes hygiene de-
partment need to know distribution of geographic location and age from patients with
some particular diseases in certain areas for emergency measure taken against public
sanitation safety issue. Ciphered electronic prescription is handed over to professional
data process service business partner for desired correct data when decrypted after
dealing with results.
(3) Cipher text search: cipher text retrieving method can perform searching di-
rectly towards cipher data based on Fully Homomorphic Encryption technology. Not
only search privacy and retrieval efficiency can be assured and boosted, addition
and multiplication computation can be perform on data searched without amending
corresponding plain text as well.
An example of homomorphic operation between user and cloud is illustrated in
Figure 3.6.
In this scenario, firstly user encrypt his personal data a and b to Enc(a) and Enc(b)
with public key, and send the encrypted results towards cloud server. Next step, when
user wants to do computation on his data, he send a request and a function f() to
cloud provider. Now that the server got the encrypted data Enc(a) and Enc(b) and
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function f(), it compute homomorphic operation f(Enc(a), Enc(b)) without knowing
actual contents of a or b using evaluation addition or evaluation multiplication.
After the cloud computing process, server send back encrypted results to the client.
Finally user use private key to decrypt the result f(Enc(a), Enc(b)) and recover f(),
which is the same as it carried out operations on raw data. From this example, we
can see that the homomorphic operation at server side does not require private key
of user and support arbitrary computation such as addition and multiplication on
encrypted client data.
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4 AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT RELATED WORKS
In this chapter we briefly review the existing related works in the past few years.
In 2012, Lopez-Alt, Eran Tromer, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan[10] first proposed
LTV Homomorphic Encryption scheme. They use the NTRUEncrypt, one of the
earliest attempts towards encryption based on latiice problem, to obtain a practical
Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme with several differences from original NTRU-
Encrypt.
In 2014, two years following proposal by Lopez-Alt, et al[10], LTV homomorphic
encryption is implemented in software complied C environment by K.Rohloff [50].
This method relied on the manipulation of very large integers so that the system was
both secure and capable of supporting the evaluation of sufficiently large circuits.
Prior implementations designs, for the most part, reckon on single threaded execu-
tion on commoditary CPU due to difficulty of lack of native support for multi-thread
execution with underlying software libraries. This case in addition to the inherent
computational cost of secure computing using known SWHE and FHE schemes, pre-
vented the practical use of SWHE and FHE.
Therefore, the paper reported a design, implementation and evaluation of a scal-
able Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme which addresses the limitation for secure
arbitrary computation. It used multi-core processor as advantage of parallelism with
further support on key switching and modulus reduction. The basis of the design is a
layered software services stack to provide high level Fully Homomorphic Encryption
operations supported by lower level lattice based primitive implementations runnning
on a computing substrate. The Fully Homomorphic Encryption is implemented and
evaluated to run on a commodity CPU-based computing enviroment with Mathworks
Matlab environment and Matlab coder toolkit to generate an ANSI C representation.
This ANSI C using gcc to run as an executable in a Linux environment. Presented
experiment results of their performance show that their Fully Homomorphic Encryp-
39
tion implementation provide at least an order of magnitude improvement in runtime
as compared to recent publicly known evalution results of other software implemen-
tation.
Another work by Dai [51] in 2014 proposed a GPU optimized library to support
Fully homomorphic Encryption. Despite the active advances witnessed 5 years af-
ter Gentry’s first proposed plausible Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme and 2
years after the introduction of LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme, FHE
still has not sufficiently prepared to directly benefit public. Motivated by some
main bottlenecks concentrated on practical FHE, this paper build a large polyno-
mial arithmetic library optimized for NVIDIA GPU to support Fully Homomorphic
Encryption scheme. In the experiment, a server equipped with Intel Xeon E5-2609
running @2.5GHz, 64 GBytes of memory, and a NVIDIA GeForce GTX 690 running
@915MHz with 3072 stream processors and 4 GBytes of memory are used.
To realize the large polynomial arithmetic library, they convert polynomial with
large coefficients using Chinese Remainder Theorem(CRT) into many polynomial
with small coefficients, and then carry out modular multiplication in the residue
space using custom developed Discrete Fourier Transform based library. The library
is further extended to support the homomorphic evaluation operations and Number
Theoretical Transform(NTT) is utilized to realize large polynomial arithmetic. This
method demonstrated significant speedups over previous reported results. Additional
conclusion is drawn that the efficiency is limited by the memory of the target GPU.
Hence, even greater speedup may be achieved simpley by moving to GPU with more
memory.
A new multiplier architecture introduced by Y.Doroz[52] in 2015. A custom hard-
ware accelerator optimized for a class of reconfigurable logic to bring LTV based Ho-
momophic encryption scheme on estep closer to deployment in real life application.
The accelerator achieved time complexity of O(NlogNloglogN) and space of O(Nn2)
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in circuit level. The accelerator introduced is connected via a fast PCIe interface to
a CPU platform to provide homomorphic evaluation service to any application that
needed to support computations. A number theoretical transform based multiplier
architecture capable of effciently handling very large polynomials is introduced. The
gap between what is currently available on a CPU and what is practical in real life
is somehow too far to consider software only solutions. This trigger researchers to
study the use of alternative platforms such as graphic processing units (GPU) and re-
configurable logic such as FPGAs. What is more, even further domain specific ASIC
designs to accelerate homomorphic evaluations.
The main contributions of the paper are FPGA architecture presented to acceler-
ate LTV FHE scheme and FPGA device connected to PC with high speed interface.
This architecture may be considered as implementation of an external FHE acceler-
ator that will speedup homomorphic evaluations taking place on a CPU. AES block
cipher is used as an accelerator to homomorphic evaluation synthesized for the Xilinx
Virtex 7 family. Efficiency of large polynomial computation is improved on different
platforms as similar CPU and GPU implementations.
In 2016, an FPGA based computation accelerator as part of a homomorphic en-
cryption processing unit co-processor was designed to implement key computation
application [53]. In this paper, advanced designing and an FPGA based computa-
tion accelerator are implemented as part of a homomorphic encryption processing
unit co-processor. This hardware accelerator technology improves the practicality of
computing on encrypted data by reducing the computational bottleneck of lattice
encryption primitives that support homomorphic encryption scheme.
The strategy of the paper is to accelerate key computational bottleneck common
across Homomoephic Encryption schemes which can be much more rapidly executed
on FPGA architectures. Chinese Remainder Transform and inverse Chinese Remain-
der Transform are used to accelerate power of 2 rings and other basic ring arith-
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metic such as ring addition, ring subtraction and ring multiplication. The paper
focus on experimental performance analysis on LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption
scheme, instantiating this capability in a Xilinx Virtex-7 FPGA that can attached to
a host computer through either a PCI express port or Ethernet. They experimentally
compare performance with reference software implementation of the CRT and iCRT
bottleneck on a commodity CPU.
Anothe paper [62] provide a new potential of FPGAs for speeding up homomor-
phic encryption operations. In this work, a functional FPGA implementation of ho-
momorphic encryption multiplication operation of large polynomials in Zq[x]/(x
N+1)
whose ring dimension is determined by N which is a positive integer of form 2k. While
the paper use NTT algorithm to perform polynomial multiplication, which has time
complexity of O(NlogN), it demonstrate architecture space complexity of O(Nn2). It
also provide results and performance measurement of implementation equipped with
Xilinx Spartan 6 LX100 FPGA.
A paper published in 2017 [1] proposed a software/hardware co-designed accel-
erator implemented through a high level synthesis flow to accelerate homomorphic
computation. They demonstrated a large modular polynomial multiplier configurable
in both degree and coefficients size, as well as proposed a modular polynomial reducer
based on polynomial with general form allowing optimization in the homomorphic
context.The hardware part implements the product of large coefficients in RNS do-
main, and the schoolbook multiplication algorithm at polynomial level resulting in
complexity of O(N2) in terms of time and O(n2) in terms of area. The designing and
implementation of the modular multiplier which integrates a multiplier on polynomial
with large coefficients and large degree with fast software computation are based on
the FPGA underlying computation accelerator.
The proposed high speed accelerator works in the same primitive as LTV cryp-
tosystem with polynomial ring of form Rq[x] = Zq[x]/(φ(x)) with respect to the
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Table 4.1: Truncated polynomial ring multiplier performance in [1]
N n Platform # Register Latency(µs)
512 32 XC7V585T 102 66.41
1024 26 Spartan 6 114 69.1
φ(x) = xN + 1 where N is power of 2. The interface between hardware and software
can be performed through a high performance AXI bus or a PCI express bus in the
case of computer precessor. Results of their approach are demonstrated in Table 4.1.
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5 PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE FOR FULLY
HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
This chapter gives a comprehensive presentation and explanation of our proposed
work. We put our minds into optimizing the process of encryption part where the
operations are performed on user side in the cloud computing model since the genera-
tion of public keys and secret keys are precomputed. Thus the calculations performed
by the server including evaluation or more, are beyond our focus.
A novel variant of LFSR arithmetic architecture is proposed to implement LTV
Fully Homomorphic Encryption. Conventional LFSR structure is expanded and mod-
ified for performing the truncated polynomial ring multiplication in Rq[x].
The specific part we are going to concentrate on is the encryption equation
c = hs + 2e + m where ciphertext c is derived from public key h, message m and
sample polynomial s, e. The efficiency of LTV system is significantly impacted by
the speed of multiplication of truncated polynomials with high degree and large co-
efficients. Taking the advantage of parallelism for computation of multiplication in
LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme, our proposed work based on LFSR
structure reduced the time complexity of quasi-linear time O(NlogNloglogN) in [52]
and O(NlogN) in [62] to linear time O(N) for polynomial multiplication, which is
beneficial with large value of degree N .
As for the large integer multiplication, we then proposed to choose Mersenne
number q to further speedup the modular multiplication. The special moduli sets,
including 2n + 1,2n, 2n − 1,etc, which have drawn much more attention than normal
moduli when constructing modular adders and modular multipliers, offers a great
time reduction on modular reduction when performing modular multiplications as
well as modular additions.
Novel and efficient modular multiplier, modular adder and modular subtractor
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are proposed for high speed processing of LFSR operations. We leverage to select
parallel prefix structure which provide efficient modular addition over other popular
adders. What is more, booth parallel multiplier are used to perform modular mul-
tiplication with reduced number of partial products during which the accumulation
process taking place.
5.1 LFSR Based Structure
In this section, firstly basic knowledge is introduced about LFSR(Linear Feedback
Shift Register) and its applications. Then the proposed LFSR based architecture is
presented to realize truncated polynomial ring multiplication in encryption part of
LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme. The details about the proposed archi-
tecture is explained with given algorithm and a architecture complexity analysis. A
table of register contents is shown for better understanding of how the multiplication
works in the LFSR-like multiplier system.
5.1.1 Linear Feedback Shift Register
LFSR (Linear Feedback Shift Register) is an elegant way to generate long pseudo-
random sequences with most applications in pesudo-random numbers, fast digital
counters, and cryptography which has cryptographically strong properties and un-
complicated hardware implementation advantages. An LFSR consisted of clocked
storage elements(flip-flop) and a feedback path. The number of storage elements rep-
resent the degree of LFSR, while feedback network computes the input for the last
flip-flop as XOR-sum of certain flip-flops in the shift register.
The stream value of outputs generated by registers and logic arithmetic is de-
pendent on its previous state with maximum length of 2N − 1 when initial state as
non-zero value, where N is highest degree of characteristic polynomial.
A example given in Figure 5.1 illustrate the basic structure of an LFSR initialized
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Fig. 5.1: Linear Feedback Shift Register
by characteristic polynomial f(x). which is represented as:
f(x) = fNx
N + fN−1xN−1 + ...+ f1x1 + 1 (23)
In figure 5.1, a
⊕
refers to an adder, a
⊗
refers to a multiplier and  represents
a register. Assume that registers are initially loaded with coefficients of polynomial
A(x) = (a0, a1...aN−1), a shift to right operation of LSFR is equivalent to performing
A(x)× x mod f(x), where x is root of characteristic polynomial f(x).
5.1.2 Proposed truncated polynomial ring multiplier
The polynomial multiplication and addition in LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption
scheme is taken modulo xN + 1, a modification of original LFSR is designed to ac-
commodate the truncated polynomial ring computation.
Specifically, original LFSR can complete the operation without substantial mul-
tiplication because the polynomial coefficients always have value from {−1, 0, 1} as
ternary polynomial. In our case, however, the coefficients integer has much larger
range of values in {0, q − 1}.
The contents of registers are initialized as integer coefficients of polynomial 2e+m,
let values of register be c(j),(j is from 0 to N)in clock cycle N , contents of each
register is denoted as c
(j)
N−1, c
(j)
N−2, ..., c
(j)
1 , c
(j)
0 . Specific steps to perform the truncated
polynomial ring multiplication is shown in Algorithm 5.1.
In this algorithm, three inputs are polynomial h(x) representing public key, s(x)
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Algorithm 5.1 Multiplication in Rq[x] for LTV FHE
Input: h = hN−1, ..., h0 ; s = sN−1, ..., s0; e ; m
Output: c = cN−1, ..., c0 = hs+ 2e+m ∈ Rq
c(0) := 2e+m ∈ Rq
for j := 1 to N do
for i := 0 to N − 1 do
if i = N − 1 then
c
(j)
((i+1)) := −c(j−1)i + h((i+1)) × s((N−j)) mod q
else
c
(j)
((i+1)) := c
(j−1)
i + h((i+1)) × s((N−j)) mod q
end if
end for
end for
return c(N) := hs+ 2e+m ∈ Rq
*((A)) denote A mod N .
as one of the sample polynomials, and 2e(x) +m(x) comprised of sample polynomial
and message polynomial, each with N coefficients.
Because truncated polynomial rings in LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme
are taken modulo xN + 1, there are arithmetic scenarios of both addition and sub-
traction in this computation, in other words, either positive or negative value of
multiplication result could be added to next round of operation.
Based on above algorithm, an LFSR originated architecture to perform LTV Fully
Homomorphic Encryption scheme polynomial multiplication in Rq[x] is proposed as
Figure 5.2.
In this structure, it is required to lay out N − 1 modular q adders, 1 modu-
lar q subtractor, N modular q multipliers and N registers. Each register can store
value of [log2 q] bits length. The arithmetic of modular multiplication and mod-
ular addition are performed in modular q multiplier and modular q adder, which
also cause noticeable time delay and will be introduced in next section. Regis-
ters c = (cN−1, cN−2, ..., c1, c0) are initially loaded with coefficients of polynomial
2e(x) + m(x), the coefficients of polynomial h(x) are input to each modular multi-
plier in parallel manner while the coefficients of polynomial s(x) are input to every
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modular multiplier in a serial fashion.
𝑐𝑁−1 𝑐1 𝑐0…
𝑠0, 𝑠1…𝑠𝑁−2, 𝑠𝑁−1
ℎ0ℎ1ℎ𝑁−2ℎ𝑁−1
𝑀𝑜𝑑 𝑞 multiplier 𝑀𝑜𝑑 𝑞 adder 𝑐𝑁 register 𝑀𝑜𝑑 𝑞 subtractor
Fig. 5.2: LFSR Based LTV FHE Architecture
The Registers c(x) = (cN , cN−1, ..., c1, c0) will store the result of multiplication
c(N) = h(x)s(x) + 2e(x) + m(x) at clock cycle N . Table 5.1 shows the register
contents in clock cycle 0, 1, ..., N − 1, N .
5.2 Mersenne Number for Moduli
The major cumbrance of architecture for performing modular reduction multipli-
cation of large coefficient truncated polynomial described above is the costly large
integer multiplication with additional long integer modulo computation which cause
significant hardware usage and may limit the clock frequency in terms of long critical
path.
We proposed a series of methods and optimization approaches to speedup the
process of large integer multiplication and addition, which easily takes up most of the
computation resourses in the proposed LFSR based structure for truncated polyno-
mial ring multiplication in LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme encryption
process.
Two basic operations are generalized in multiplication arithmetic, the generation
of partial product and their accumulation. In order to speed up the most time con-
suming process, two available approaches can be considered. Reducing the number of
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partial product is one of them. Several classical algorithms such as booth algorithm
is used to cover this part. Moreover, the goal of faster multiplication can be achieved
by accelerating the process of accumulation of partial products. Apparently, when
smaller number of partial products are generated, the complexity and time acquired
to accumulate partial results are both reduced eventually.
The special and well established moduli sets of 2n − 1, 2n and 2n + 1 are widely
Table 5.2: A list of some known Mersenne prime
p Mp Mp digits Mp bit length
2 3 1 2
3 7 1 3
5 31 2 5
7 127 3 7
13 8191 4 13
17 131071 6 17
19 524287 6 17
31 2147483647 10 31
61 2305843009213693951 19 61
89 618970019642...137449562111 27 89
107 162259276829...578010288127 33 107
127 170141183460...715884105727 39 127
...
used in digital and signal processing, Residue Number System(RNS), cryptography
areas due to its unique number theorectic properties. For example, a modulo 2n − 1
addition is equivalent to one’s complement. However, only modulo number in form
of 2n − 1 could be adopted in our design. Below are the reasons why.
In mathematics, a integer number with form of 2n+1 is named as Fermat number,
although there exist infinite amount of Fermat numbers, only a few of them are
prime numbers. As for now, the solely 5 Fermat prime are discovered and listed:
F0, F1, F2, F3, F4, where Fn has form of 2
2n + 1. Obviously, special moduli set of
2n + 1, 2n are not available for LTV scenario because it require modulo number q to
be a large prime number.
That left us with only choice of modulo 2n−1. The q needs to be a prime number
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and also satisfy the formation of 2n − 1. In mathematics, a Mersenne prime is a
prime number that is one less than a power of two, that is a prime number of the
form Mn = 2
n − 1 for some integer n. A list of some known Mersenne primes are
show in Table 5.2.
Modular 2n − 1 arithmetic is congruent to zero modulo 2n − 1, while zero can
be represented by an n-bit binary string of all zeros or all ones in modulo 2n − 1
arithmetic. Also the carry output at the most significant bit position of each stage
has a weight of 2n, which, in modulo 2n − 1 arithmetic, is equal to 1.
In LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme, one of the most crucial parts is
deciding the value of q. Mersenne prime number q can be utilized to optimize modulo
reduction operation on multiplier design level by selecting certain parameter sets from
existing Mersenne prime numbers shown in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Selected parameter sets
q bit length
M31 31
M61 61
M89 89
M107 107
M127 127
5.3 Modular Adder
An adder is an indispensable component for a processing system and integrated cir-
cuits. In our proposed work, a particular kind of adder is needed for modular 2n − 1
addition with good implementation performances.
In general cases, area and time delay has always been two most important factors
that should be taken in consideration when choosing the right adder. Theoretically,
prefix adder is much faster than carry look ahead adder, carry skip adder, etc. Com-
pared to other adder topologies, prefix adder has highly regular structure, it consists
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of only a few sub-modules.
Integrated circuits have their own unique form of wiring to connect together the
micro miniature components they contain. Interconnection in a given layer can not
cross over each other without sorting out. So that the interconnection of one arith-
metic module topology plays important role in operation unit performance. Prefix
adder has simple layout and regular interconnections.
A comprehensive analysis of different adder topologies of different word size is
provided through existing works. The analysis and results are helpful for choosing a
specific adder for the application of our proposed architecture.
The performance comparison of different popular adders in the literature is shown
as Table 5.4[54][55][56][57].
Table 5.4: An adder performance comparison
Adder size(bit) 16 32 64 128 16 32 64 128
Adder type Delay(ns)[54][55][54] Area(µm2)[54] Area[57]
Kogge-Stone adder 0.42 0.49 0.87 1.21 1005.7 2254.98 481 1272
Ripple-carry-adder 1.14 2.23 - 1.61 285.33 570.67 418 9312
Carry lookahead adder 0.59 0.83 1.08 1.19 626.04 1360.50 - 410
Carry select adder 0.60 0.85 - - 610.55 1387.25 - -
Carry skip adder 0.65 0.96 1.59 2.50 445.7 780.28 - -
From the table, it is appropriate to use parallel prefix adder as modular adder
in the LFSR based multiplier. There are extra benefits of utilizing prefix adder.
It is discovered carry propagation in the modular addition of two n-bit number is
basically a prefix problem. The prefix structure is defined as the outcome of operation
depends on the initial inputs. Therefore parallel prefix adder could be used to perform
the efficient algorithm with execution of operations in parallel, which is done by
segmentation into smaller pieces computed in parallel.
Since there are a dozen of different types of prefix adders in the literature. Some of
the key architectures for carry calculations are Kogge-Stone adder, J.Sklansky adder,
Ladner-Fisher adder, Brent Kung adder, Han Carlson adder and S.Knowles adder.
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According to the implementation analysis[2] of Table 5.5, it is obvious that Kogge-
Stone adder has the best results of time cost. So that Kogge-Stone style is used for
the build up of the parallel prefix adder.
Table 5.5: A comparison of different prefix adders[2]
Adder type Area(µm2) Total power (µW ) Delay(ps)
Brent kung 1354.99 85.08 825.9
Han Carlson 1832.34 102.51 593.9
S.Knowles 2345.57 127.64 565.7
Lander Fischer 1512.49 90.21 676.8
J.Sklansky 1681.52 99.58 831.8
Kogge Stone 2669.91 137.22 561.5
The structure of an parallel prefix adder is illustrate as Figure 5.3. In order to
𝑎𝑛−2𝑎𝑛−1 𝑎1 𝑎0𝑏𝑛−1 𝑏𝑛−2 𝑏1 𝑏0
…
Carry computation(prefix 
structure)
𝑠𝑛−1 𝑠𝑛−2 𝑠1 𝑠0
…
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑐𝑖𝑛
𝑐𝑛−2 𝑐1 𝑐0
𝑐0
′𝑐𝑛−3
′𝑐𝑛−2
′
Fig. 5.3: General structure of prefix adder
describe the property of prefix problem, we define a operator •, for i = 0, 1, ..n,
suppose A = an−1an−2...a0 and B = bn−1bn−2...b0 represent two numbers to be added
and S = sn−1sn−2...s0 denote their output sum. Parallel prefix addition is staged
into three steps. The pre-processing stage, prefix computation and post processing
stage. In pre-processing stage, carry generate g, carry propagate p and half sum hi
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is computed as:
gi = aibi
pi = ai + bi
hi = ai ⊕ bi
Carry computation can be transformed into a prefix problem using the operator •
defined as follows:
(gm, pm) • (gk, pk) = (gm + pm · gk, pm · pk). (24)
input is a vector of pairs of carry generate and carry propagate bits:
(gn, pn), (gn−1, pn−1), ..., (g1, p1), (g0, p0),
while the output is new pairs of vectors:
(Gn, Pn), (Gn−1, Pn−1), ..., (G1, P1), (G0, P0).
The carry bits ci for each bit position ci = Gi, where (g0, p0), if i = 0,(gi, pi) • (Gi−1, Pi−1), if 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
For i = 0 to n− 1,
ci = the first component of (gi, pi)• ...•(g0, p0)•(gn−1, pn−1)• ...•(gn+1, pn+1) (25)
In Figure 5.3, consider G
′
i, P
′
i be the group generate and group propagate in the next
level, then
(G
′
i, P
′
i ) = (Gi + Pi · c−1, Pi) (26)
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Fig. 5.4: Prefix adder logic operators and implementation
We get c
′
i = the first component of (G
′
i, P
′
i ) = (Gi + Pi · Gn−1, Pi), which means
that the parallel prefix adder is transformed into a modulo 2n − 1 adder using Gn−1
as cin.
After the computation of the carries ci, in the last step of post processing stage,
the sum bits si can be computed as follows where i = 0 to n− 1,
si = hi ⊕ ci−1
The Modular adder with prefix structure are represented in four modules implemented
by logic gates. The prefix adder logic operators are visualized in Figure 5.4.
The carry computation use Kogge and Stone style, which is the fastest among
other existing structure, shown in Figure 5.5.
5.4 Modular Subtractor
The design of modulo 2n− 1 subtractors is based on the modulo 2n− 1 adder. Figure
5.6 shows the structure of the proposed modular subtractor adapted from modular
adder.
Let A = an−1...a0 and B = bn−1...b0 denote two n-bit modulo 2n − 1 operands,
such that 0 ≤ A,B ≥ 2n − 1. The difference, D, of A and B modulo 2n − 1 is equal
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… 𝑝0, 𝑔0𝑝7, 𝑔7 𝑝2, 𝑔2𝑝5, 𝑔5 ……
𝑐0𝑐1𝑐2𝑐3𝑐4𝑐5𝑐6𝑐7
Fig. 5.5: Parallel prefix structure with n=8
𝑎𝑛−2𝑎𝑛−1 𝑎1 𝑎0𝑏𝑛−1 𝑏𝑛−2 𝑏1 𝑏0
…
Carry computation(prefix 
structure)
𝑠𝑛−1 𝑠𝑛−2 𝑠1 𝑠0
…
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑐𝑖𝑛
𝑐𝑛−2 𝑐1 𝑐0
𝑐0
′
𝑐𝑛−3
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′
Fig. 5.6: Modular 2n − 1 subtractor
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to
D = |A−B|2n−1 = |A+ (2n − 1)−B|2n−1 =
∣∣A+B∣∣
2n−1 (27)
Where B denotes the one’s complement of operand B. It is obvious that the
difference D is actually an addition of A and B modulo 2n − 1, resulting that a
straightforward hardware implementation based on modulo 2n − 1 adder.
A combined modulo 2n − 1 adder or subtractor can also be easily derived by
replacing the  module in modular adder structure with a new module  where the
input XOR gates is amended to NXOR gate, and a NOT gate is added before the
inputs to AND and OR gates in order to invert the bits of operand B in case of
subtraction as shown in Figure 5.7.
𝑏𝑖
𝑔𝑖
′ 𝑝𝑖
′ℎ𝑖
′
=
Inputs:𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖
Output:𝑔𝑖
′, ℎ𝑖
′, 𝑝𝑖
′
𝑎𝑖
Fig. 5.7: Modular 2n − 1 subtractor submodule
The truth table of the subtractor submodule is given by Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Truth table for Modular subtractor module
ai bi h
′
i g
′
i p
′
i
0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1
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5.5 Modular Multiplier
We adapted a radix-4 booth encoded modulo 2n−1 multiplier for our design. Numbers
of partial products are reduced through booth algorithm. Further reduction of the
partial product can be implemented by CSA arrays The two operands produced are
added in the parallel prefix modulo 2n − 1 adder which we covered previously. The
final product is the addition result of the prefix adder.
For modulo multiplication:
P = X · Y mod (2n − 1) (28)
Various ROM-based solutions using lookup table have been proposed befre so-
phisticated methods are introduced to reduce the table sizes by combining smaller
lookup table with simple arithmetic operations, such as additions. For word lengths
larger than particular bits, however, these solutions still require large ROM or too
many numbers of clock cycles for evaluation.
Efficient modulo 2n − 1 multiplier are widely researched in selected works of [58]
[59] [60] [61].
The major difference between conventional multiplier and modulo 2n−1 multiplier
is that the partial product array of normal binary multiplier is shaped as triangle,
while the partial product array of modulo 2n − 1 multiplier is shaped as rectangle.
All rows of partial product for the modulo 2n − 1 multiplier are located on the same
bit position.
The carry output at the most significant bit position of each stage has a weight
of 2n, which is equal to 1 in modulo 2n − 1 arithmetic. In other words, carry out of
the most significant bit should be shifted to the least significant bit position.
In traditional multiplier, the column size for different column is different, while for
modulo 2n − 1 multiplier, the column size of any column is the same, which provide
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better regularity and easier implementation.
In this section, a proposed modified radix-4 booth algorithm modulo 2n − 1 mul-
tiplier. Supposed that A = an−1an−2an−3...a2a1a0 and B = bn−1bn−2bn−3...b2b1b0 are
two n-bit input of the modulo 2n − 1 multiplier. A is the multiplicand and B is
multiplier. Let |A|x denote the modulo x residue of A.
Using booth algorithm to reduce the number of partial products, the multiplicand
B can be represented by:
B =
n−1∑
i=0
bi2
i = (b0 − 2b1) +
bn2 c∑
i=1
(b2i−1 + b2i − 2b2i+1)22i (29)
Where bj = 0 for j ≥ n and bkc denote the largest integer smaller than or equal
to k.
The value of the product A×B modulo 2n− 1 can consequently be expressed by:
|AB|2n−1 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣A
bn+12 c−1∑
i=0
(b2i−1 + b2i − 2b2i+1)22i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2n−1
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
bn+12 c−1∑
i=0
∣∣A(b2i−1 + b2i − 2b2i+122i)∣∣2n−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2n−1
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
bn+12 c−1∑
i=0
P (i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2n−1
(30)
Where P (i) = |A(b2i−1 + b2i − 2b2i+1)22i|2n−1
Since the term be,i = (b2i−1+b2i−2b2i+1) can take values in the set (−2,−1, 0,+1,+2)
, be,i2
2i = s2j, where
s =

+1, if be,i = +1,+2
0, if be,i = 0
−1, if be,i = −1,−2
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j =

0, if be,i = 0
2i, if be,i = +1,−1
2i+ 1, if be,i = +2,−2
From this, we get P (i) = |sAj|2n−1.
Using the following expression, the partial products can derived as P (i) = |sA2j|2n−1,
in n bits, directly from multiplicand A.
For the three circumstances:
• s = +1. we get :
∣∣sA2j∣∣
2n−1 = |an−1−jan−2−j...a0an−1an−2...an−j|2n−1
= an−1−jan−2−j...a0an−1an−2...an−j
• s = −1. Taking into account that |−Y |x = |x− Y |x, so that:
∣∣sA2j∣∣
2n−1 = |(2n − 1)− (an−1−jan−2−j...a0an−1an−2...an−j)|2n−1
= |an−1−jan−2−j...a0an−1an−2...an−j|2n−1
= an−1−jan−2−j...a0an−1an−2...an−j
• s = 0. In this case, |sA2j|2n−1 = 0 = 000...000︸ ︷︷ ︸
nbits
To give a more detailed expression of the all cases, Table 5.7 is provided with the
formation of the partial products.
According to the first and the last row of Table 5.7, all 1s input and all 0s input
are supposed to be treated as a zero input.
A Booth Encoder (BE) and Booth Selector (BS) are used for input transform of
B to partial product bit bi with multiplicand A. The Booth Encoder(BE) produces a
signed digit represented by a sign bit s and two encoded magnitude bits ck and ck+1
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Table 5.7: Formation of the partial products
b2i+1 b2i b2i−1 Meaning P (i)
0 0 0 0 000...000 or 111...111
0 0 1 |A22i|2n−1 an−1−2ian−2−2i...a0an−1an−2...an−2i
0 1 0 |A22i|2n−1 an−1−2ian−2−2i...a0an−1an−2...an−2i
0 1 1 |A22i+1|2n−1 an−1−(2i+1)an−2−(2i+1)...a0an−1an−2...an−(2i+1)
1 0 0 |−A22i+1|2n−1 an−1−(2i+1)an−2−(2i+1)...a0an−1an−2...an−(2i+1)
1 0 1 |−A22i|2n−1 an−1−2ian−2−2i...a0an−1an−2...an−2i
1 1 0 |−A22i|2n−1 an−1−2ian−2−2i...a0an−1an−2...an−2i
1 1 1 0 000...000 or 111...111
from 3 consecutive multiplier bits b2i−1,b2i,b2i+1. The leftmost bit of a BE bit slice
b2i−1 is shared with the rightmost bit of the preceding BE bit slice b2i+1. To generate
the P (i) vector given by Table 5.7, the encoded bits, ck,ck+1 are used to select either
the multiplicand or one bit shift multiplicand. The sign bit s determine if the selected
word need ot be complemented.
𝑏2𝑖−1
𝑏2𝑖
𝑏2𝑖+1
c𝑘
𝑐𝑘+1
𝑠
BE
Fig. 5.8: Implementation of Booth Encoder(BE)
Table 5.8: Truth table for Booth Encoder(BE)
b2i+1 b2i b2i−1 s ck+1 ck
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 0 0
A bit slice of the radix 4 Booth Encoder (BE) is given in Figure 5.8 with its truth
Table 5.8. A bit slice of the radix 4 Booth Selector (BS) is given in Figure 5.9 with
61
its truth Table 5.9.
BS
c𝑘
𝑐𝑘+1
𝑠
𝑎𝑖
𝑎𝑖−1
𝒅𝒊
Fig. 5.9: Implementation of Booth Selector(BS)
Table 5.9: Truth table for Booth Selector(BS)
s ck+1 ck di
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 ai
0 1 0 ai−1
1 0 0 ai−1
1 0 1 ai
1 1 0 1
For radix-4 Booth encoding scheme, the number of partial products will be reduced
to bn/2c+1 and bn/2c. where bac represent the smallest integer greater that or equal
to a.
To understand the essence of this algorithm, consider a multiplication operation
in which the multiplier is positive and has a single block of 1s, for example, 0011110.
To derive the product, we could adder four appropriately shifted versions of the
multiplicand, as in the standard procedure. However, we can reduce the numbe
of required operations by regarding this multiplier as the difference between two
numbers:
0100000 (32)
−0000010 (2)
0011110 (30)
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This suggest that the product can be generated by adding 25 times the multipli-
cand to the 2’s complement of 21 times the multiplicand. For convenience, we can
describe the sequence of required operations by recording the preceding multiplier as
0 + 1000 − 10.
For high performance modulo multiplication, dedicated multipliers are required
which can be implemented as combinational or pipeline circuits. A modulo 2n − 1
multiplier architecture with modulo reduced, Booth recorded partial products and
with concurrent modulo reduction during carry save addition is improved in this
paper. In following paragraph, the proposed design for a modulo 2n−1 multiplier will
MPPG
𝑏7−5
MPPG
𝑏5−3
MPPG
𝑏3−1
MPPG
𝑏1,0,−1
𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐴
𝑝7−0
(3)
𝑝7−0
(2) 𝑝7−0
(1)
𝑝7−0
(0)
𝑎7−0 𝑎7−0 𝑎7−0 𝑎7−0
Fig. 5.10: Modular Multiplier
be presented. The Figure 5.10 shows the general structure of modular 2n−1 multiplier
with n = 8. The structure is consisted of modules of MPPG (Multiplication Partial
Product Generation) and MPPA(Multiplication Partial Product Accumulation). The
multiplicand B and multiplier A input to MPPG with output of partial product bits
fed into MPPA module.
In MPPG module, there are 4 Booth Encoders and 32 Booth Selectors. After the
multiplicand B and multiplier A inputs to Booth Encoder and Booth Selector and
undergo radix 4 Booth algorithm, the partial product bits are generated at each level
as p
(j)
i , where p
(j)
i means the i bit of the partial product at level j. Figure 5.11 shows
the structure of MPPG.
Note that all n-bit partial products p
(j)
i have the same magnitude, as opposed to
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ordinary multiplication, where the partial products have increasing magnitude. The
number of products bits to be added is the same for all bit positions. This allows
their addition by a highly regular modulo carry save adder layout composed of (3,2)
counters.
BS BS BS BS… BE
𝑏5
𝑏6
𝑏7
𝑎2𝑎3𝑎0
𝑎1
𝑝0
(3)
𝑝1
(3)
𝑝6
(3)
𝑝7
(3)
333
…
Fig. 5.11: Multiplication Partial Product Generation(MPPG)
In the MPPA module, a carry save adder tree is used to accelerate the addition
of the partial products, which is a easily applicable technique to integrated with
modulo multiplier. The proposed carry save adder tree structure is more regular
than conventional multiplier, because the same number of bits is added for each bit
position and the carry outs are fed back into the carry ins. In cell based designs, the
lower regularity of tree structures compared to linear ones has a negligible impact on
circuit area, while considerable speedup is achieved.
Figure 5.12 depicts the MPPA module of the modular multiplier architecture.
Generated partial products bits are fed into n-operand carry save addition and go
through carry propagate addition steps, note that the carry out is directly fed into
carry in of next level. Final step is performing modulo (2n−1) addition with modular
adder proposed.
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Fig. 5.12: Multiplication Partial Product Accumulation(MPPA)
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6 COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS AND FPGA IM-
PLEMENTATION
This chapter gives a introduction for complexity in terms of area and time in pro-
posed architecture of multiplication in Rq[x] for LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption
scheme. The complexity of sub modules comprised for the general architecture is first
given. For the different sub modules, we have a table shows the corresponding gate
count and critical path delay. A list of area cost and critical path delay are presented
in the next table on a general view for the LFSR based multiplier structure.
The results of implementations and simulations on FPGA paltform are also given
in this chapter. After a general measurement of several main implementation tech-
nologies, we compare our results with some of the existing implementations out-
come and analyzed the performance differences. We use device of Cyclone IV GX
EP4CGX15BF14C6 for compilation on Quartus II 13.1 web edition.
6.1 Complexity Analysis
Table 6.1: Modules used in proposed architecture
Module Modular
multiplier
Modular
adder
Register Modular
subtractor
# Modules N N − 1 N 1
A brief estimation of complexity is presented in this section. This analysis assumes
that each gate counts as one elementary gate for both area and delay. The model
ignores fan in and fan out. The validation of the estimates that it produce will be
carried out later by FPGA implementation.
Table 6.1 gives the module complexity of proposed polynomial multiplier in Rq[x]
architecture. The structure require N − 1 modular q adders, 1 modular q subtractor,
N modular q multipliers and N registers. Each register stores value of [log2 q] bits
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length.
Table 6.2: Space complexity for each module
Modular units
Space complexity
# XOR # AND # OR # NXOR # NOT
Adder 2n− 1 2n dlog2ne+ 3n n+ n dlog2ne − 2dlog2ne + 1 0 0
Subtractor n− 1 2n dlog2ne+ 3n n+ n dlog2ne − 2dlog2ne + 1 n n
Multiplier 2n2 − 1 3n2 − 4n 32n2 − n 0 0
For combination of different modules. The gate count is show in Table 6.2. We
use basic logic gate of XOR gate, AND gate, OR gate, NXOR gate and NOT gate
count to measure the space complexity. Each full adder (3,2 counter) is of two XOR
gates, 2 AND gates and 1 OR gate. From the table we can see that the number of
gate count of modular subtractor is close to that of modular adder with same amount
of XOR gate, AND gate, OR gate and more NXOR gate, NOT gate.
For time complexity, we show critical time delay in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Time complexity for each module
Modular units Critical path delay
Adder 2 dlog2ne+ 3
Subtractor 2 dlog2ne+ 4
Multiplier 3
2
n+ 2 · dlog2ne+ 4
In the end, we give the comprehensive presentation of time and space complexity
of proposed truncated polynomial ring multiplier in Rq[x] with Table 6.4 and 6.5.
Table 6.4: Space complexity of proposed multiplier in Rq[x]
# XOR 2N(n2 + n− 1)− n
# AND N(3n2 + 2n dlog2ne − n)
# OR N(3
2
n2 + n dlog2ne − 2dlog2ne)
# NXOR n
# NOT n
Table 6.4 shows that the total area cost is the gate count accumulation of all
modular multiplier, modular adder and modular subtractor in the whole architecture
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with AND gate, OR gate, XOR gate grow linearly with degree N and power of 2 with
modulo length n.
Table 6.5 gives a general comparison of time and space complexity for proposed
architecture and other related works, where the critical path go through modular
mulitplier and modular adder/subtractor. The critical path delay for proposed archi-
tecture is estimated as 3
2
n+4 dlog2ne−2dlog2ne+8. It requireN clock cycles to complete
all multiplication of the polynomials. While the time complexity of polynomial multi-
plication operation is O(N2) in [1], O(NlogNloglogN) in [52] and O(NlogN) in [62],
the architecuture level space complexity is O(n2) in [1], O(Nn2) in [52] and [62].
Table 6.5: Time complexity comparison
Work Space complexity(gate count) Time complexity (latency)
proposed O(Nn2) O(N)
[1] O(n2) O(N2)
[52] O(Nn2) O(NlogNloglogN)
[62] O(Nn2) O(NlogN)
6.2 FPGA Implementation Results
6.2.1 Implementation results
We choose FPGA as the implementation platform with our research tool. The soft-
ware is Altera Quartus II 13.1 web edition with target device of Cyclone IV GX
EP4CGX15BF14C6. The details of implementation results are shown below in Table
6.6.
We collected simulation result data on FPGA implementation for LTV FHE en-
cryption large polynomial multiplication with ring dimension of N ∈ {512, 1024, 2048,
4096}. A couple of representative integer word sizes n selected in range ∈ {31, 61, 89,
107, 127} are provided. Although latency is the most significant experiment perfor-
mance factor in our design, we manage to demonstrate a series of itmes in imple-
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Table 6.6: FPGA results for the proposed system
N n Logic elements Memory bits Register Fmax Latency
512
31 2694 301568 129 41.05MHz 0.012ms
61 8442 593408 189 26.46MHz 0.019ms
107 23586 1040896 281 15.81MHz 0.032ms
1024
31 2712 349184 129 41.93MHz 0.024ms
61 8450 687104 189 25.68MHz 0.039ms
107 23591 1205248 281 16.20MHz 0.063ms
2048
61 8498 874496 189 25.98MHz 0.078ms
89 16965 1275904 245 18.98MHz 0.107ms
107 23023 1533952 281 16.37MHz 0.125ms
127 27805 1533952 281 14.99MHz 0.136ms
4096
61 8507 1249280 189 26.62MHz 0.153ms
89 16887 1822720 245 19.03MHz 0.215ms
107 23680 2191360 281 16.62MHz 0.243ms
127 27840 2191360 281 13.22MHz 0.309ms
mentation results in terms of logic elements, registers, memory bits and maximum
frequency.
From the Table 6.6 we can see that the latency grows when value of N or n
increases. We choose the sets of parameter according to the Mersenne number form
2n − 1 proposal.
6.2.2 Implementation comparison
The works on implementation of LTV methods can be roughly categorized into several
types, each has their advantages and drawbacks explained below:
CPU: This may be a classic desktop or laptop CPU or the one of the embedded
device. It usually has rather few computation cores ( < 20), but it can use the ones
it has very fast and can execute arbitrary instructions (in mostly arbitrary order)
from its assembler language. Cryptography algorithms that run on CPUs are most
software-implemented because the algorithms are merely information given to the
CPU for execution. CPUs are best at running complex, linear algorithms.
GPU: This could be desktops or laptops graphics processor or it may be supercom-
puting computation accelerator. Its characteristics are the high number of cores, the
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low speed of each core and the limited instruction set. GPUs are made to run simple
algorithms massively parallel. Much assemble to CPUs, they accept their algorithms
as pieces of information, so it’s the software that implements the algorithm.
FPGA: The FPGA is typically found in small embedded devices and is running
specialized algorithms. Its hardware can be configured post shipping, at the expense
of lower speeds of operation than with ASICs. With FPGAs, changing the hardware
layout of the integrated circuit to run the algorithm is possible. Hence algorithms run
by FPGAs are considered to be hardware implemented, because in its current state,
the hardware can run only this exact algorithm.
ASIC: This is an integrated circuit that is manufactured to run exactly one algo-
rithm. ASICs provide high speed for this algorithm usually and are used when speed
matters. An example application are Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) which
commonly use ASICs to accelerate the execution of cryptographic operations (like
AES encryption). Crypto processors commonly are simple processors with additional
crypto-specific ASICs. We are confident to see the implementation of LTV FHE
carried out on ASIC platform in the near future.
Next we generally discuss about the four types of implementation technologies in
terms of security level, speed and cost.
Security: For the security of each platform, the tendency is that the security will
increase if we go down the list from CPU to ASIC. CPUs are usually occupied by
many different processes, allowing side-channel attacks, GPUs are sometimes used for
cryptosystem, FPGAs should provide more security than CPUs and GPUs because
there are less noise of other operations on the chip and ASICs have the same benefit,
but with a bit more security assurance.
Speed: The speed increases similarly if we go down the list. CPUs must be capable
of doing many different things and can not be too much optimized in one direction,
some goes for GPUs although they have much more computation power if needed.
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Table 6.7: Cryptosystem implementation types and comparison
Implementation types Security Risk Speed Cost
Software
CPU highest slowest lowest
GPU high slow low
Hardware
FPGA low fast high
ASIC lowest fastest highest
FPGAs are faster because it can provide more optimizations and ASICs are fastest
because it customized for a particular use.
Cost: The price has a similar order. CPUs are easy to obtain, cheap to program
and it can make program running quickly. GPUs are also quite easy to obtain, it
is a bit more expensive to effectively program and can run the code somewhat fast.
FPGAs are more expensive and require to design the algorithm using the hardware
language of FPGA, which cost a lot of time, expertise and money. ASICs need to be
planned before they are built, they have long design cycles, but once the design is
down. Manufacturing them is relatively easy, a low price is available.
Table 6.7 shows the differences between hardware implementation and software
implementation platforms.
We evaluate the performance of our FPGA simulation of LTV encryption mul-
tiplication operation. The Table 6.8, and Table 6.9 below show the proposed work
simulations compared with that of some existing works.
Table 6.8 collects accordingly some large combinations of parameters in the mul-
tiplication operation for polynomial degree N ∈ {512, 1024, 2048, 4096}. We provide
the experimental data for the same parameter sets of LTV Fully Homomorphic En-
cryption scheme with other works.
The table illutrate the comparison with implementation of several runtime/latency
results from existing experiments in[1],[50],[51],[62].
Compared to CPU implementation in [50], our work has huge speed advantage
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Table 6.8: Implementation speed comparison
Work Parameter n Platform Latency(ms) Speedup
N=512
proposed 31 Cyclone IV 0.012 5.5×
FPGA[1] 32 Virtex 7 0.066 1×
proposed 61 Cyclone IV 0.019 3.5×
N=512
proposed 61 Cyclone IV 0.019 155×
CPU[50] 64 Matlab 3.27 1×
N=1024
FPGA [1] 26 Spartan 6 0.069 1×
proposed 31 Cyclone IV 0.024 2.9×
N=2048
FPGA [62] 58 Spartan 6 0.282 1×
proposed 61 Cyclone IV 0.078 3.6 ×
N=2048
CPU [50] 100 Matlab 7.94 1×
proposed 107 Cyclone IV 0.125 63.5×
N=4096
proposed 61 Cyclone IV 0.153 7.8×
GPU[51] 64 GeForce 690 1.2 1×
N=4096
proposed 107 Cyclone IV 0.243 71.5×
CPU [50] 109 Matlab 17.38 1×
of over 40 times for parameter N = 512, 1024, 2048, 4096. For the parameter of
N = 4096, n = 64 for truncated polynomial ring multiplier in Rq[x], work in [51] with
GPU based environment achieved latency of 1.2ms while we provide result of 0.153ms
for N = 4096, n = 61.
We measure the works in [1] and [62] which provide a certain experiment data
based on implmentation with different target devices in FPGA platform. For value
of N = 512 and N = 1024, [1] achieved latency of 0.066ms and 0.069ms respectively
for LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme encryption multiplication part. Our
work demonstrate 0.012ms for N = 512, n = 31, 0.019ms for N = 512, n = 61 and
0.024ms for N = 1024, n = 31.
The FPGA based experimental result in [62] shows a 0.282ms delay for N =
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Table 6.9: FPGA implementations and comparison
Work n Platform
#Logic units
used/#logic units
total
Latency(ms) Speedup
N=512
proposed 31 Cyclone IV 2694/149k(1.8%) 0.012 5.5×
FPGA[1] 32 Virtex 7 171/91k(< 1%) 0.066 1×
proposed 61 Cyclone IV 8442/149k (5.6%) 0.019 3.5×
N=1024
FPGA[1] 26 Spartan 6 182/0.6k(30%) 0.069 1×
proposed 31 Cyclone IV 2712/149k(1.8%) 0.024 2.9×
N=2048
FPGA[62] 58 Spartan 6 3846/15k (24.3%) 0.282 1×
proposed 61 Cyclone IV 8498/149k (6%) 0.078 3.6×
2048, n = 58 in large truncated polynomial ring multiplication operation, while we
achieve 0.078ms for N = 2048, n = 61.
From the Table 6.9 we get brief idea about the different family of FPGA device
utilization.
For N = 512, n = 32 in [1], 171(< 1%) slice LUT are used, while in our work for
N = 512, n = 321, 2765 (1.8%) LE are used. In addition, for parameter of N=1024,
n=26, [1] used 182(30%) of the 0.6k slice LUT in total and we used 2712(1.8%) of
total 149k LEs for N = 1024, n = 31.
For parameter N = 2048, n = 58, 3846 (24.3%) of total 15k slice LUT are used
in [62] on Spartan 6. In our work for parameterN = 2048, n = 61, 8498(6%) of total
149k LEs are utilized on device Cyclone IV.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has folowing contents: an overview of research contributions, conclusions
based on the implementation comparisons, and possible future work.
7.1 A Summary of Contributions and Significance
After the first chapter on introduction, the thesis provides the mathematical pre-
liminaries of the Homomorphic Encryption, including truncated polynomial ring and
specific steps to accomplish the LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption process, which
followed by an overview of existing works on LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption.
Then the architecture to perform encryption algorithm of LTV Fully Homomorphic
Encryption are proposed. An elaborate comparison between the proposed works and
existing works in complexity and performance is also presented.
The research contributions presented in this thesis include the followings,
• The efficiency of LTV system is significantly impacted by the speed of multipli-
cation of truncated polynomials with high degree and large coefficients.
• An new architecture for computing encryption step in LTV Fully Homomorphic
Encryption are presented. The architectural design is based on a new extension
to LFSR, which provide compact and pipeline structure and is beneficial for
multiplication of truncated polynomials with high degree and large coefficients.
• We also proposed to select a family of special moduli for modular arithmetic
over modular reduction operations. Calculation speed is much improved due
to the highly efficient modulo computation introduced by the proposed moduli.
Within the architecture, novel and efficient modular multiplier, modular adder
and modular subtractor are proposed for high speed computation.
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• We analyzed the complexity of the proposed architecure in terms of space and
time. Our proposed algorithm has great speed advantage obtaining linear time
complexity of O(N) over best result of O(NlogN) for previous works. How-
ever, the proposed architecture takes space in gate count of O(Nn2) with little
advantage in circuit area perspective.
• The simulation results of proposed architecrture implementation demonstrate
great advantage of time and speed for different sets of parameter selections and
various paltforms of implementation.
7.2 Possible Future Works
Based on the research works proposed in this thesis, the following research directions
may be worthy of further investigation:
• Design of efficient architecture for evaluation process in LTV Fully Homomor-
phic Encryption scheme.
• Design of algorithm for implementation of LTV Fully Homomorphic Encryption
system on ASIC.
• Applying the proposed structure and computation method for other Fully Ho-
momorphic Encryption schemes.
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